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Abstract
Background: Demand-side financing (DSF) interventions, including cash transfers and vouchers, have been
introduced to promote maternal and newborn health in a range of low- and middle-income countries. These
interventions vary in design but have typically been used to increase health service utilisation by offsetting
some financial costs for users, or increasing household income and incentivising ‘healthy behaviours’. This
article documents experiences and implementation factors associated with use of DSF in maternal and
newborn health.
Methods: A secondary analysis (using an adapted Supporting the Use of Research Evidence framework – SURE) was
performed on studies that had previously been identified in a systematic review of evidence on DSF interventions in
maternal and newborn health.
Results: The article draws on findings from 49 quantitative and 49 qualitative studies. The studies give insights on
difficulties with exclusion of migrants, young and multiparous women, with demands for informal fees at facilities, and
with challenges maintaining quality of care under increasing demand. Schemes experienced difficulties if
communities faced long distances to reach participating facilities and poor access to transport, and where
there was inadequate health infrastructure and human resources, shortages of medicines and problems with
corruption. Studies that documented improved care-seeking indicated the importance of adequate programme scope
(in terms of programme eligibility, size and timing of payments and voucher entitlements) to address the
issue of concern, concurrent investments in supply-side capacity to sustain and/or improve quality of care,
and awareness generation using community-based workers, leaders and women’s groups.
Conclusions: Evaluations spanning more than 15 years of implementation of DSF programmes reveal a complex
picture of experiences that reflect the importance of financial and other social, geographical and health systems
factors as barriers to accessing care. Careful design of DSF programmes as part of broader maternal and newborn
health initiatives would need to take into account these barriers, the behaviours of staff and the quality of care in
health facilities. Research is still needed on the policy context for DSF schemes in order to understand how they
become sustainable and where they fit, or do not fit, with plans to achieve equitable universal health coverage.
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Background
Women and their families can face multiple barriers to
accessing maternity care services, and financial barriers
are a well-documented concern [1, 2]. In many countries
there are demands for out-of-pocket formal fees and in-
formal payments for care services or supplies such as
medicines, sutures, gloves and diagnostic tests [3, 4].
There are the practical and financial difficulties of travel
to health centres and the opportunity costs of being
away from home or from work, or from dependents. For
poor families, any such costs can cause severe financial
hardship [5], and may result in delays or avoidance of
care-seeking that increase health risks for mothers and
newborns and further escalate costs. One approach to
ameliorate these effects is the use of ‘demand-side’
financing (DSF) interventions that are designed to
promote health by providing cash or vouchers to users
to offset some of the financial costs of using or getting
to maternity care services, or to increase household
income and incentivise ‘healthy behaviours’.
Within this overarching definition there are five types
of DSF that have been used in the health sector and
there are important differences in their intended
mechanism of action [6, 7]. Conditional cash transfers,
which have been widely used in Latin America, aim to
increase utilisation of maternity care services by making
regular payments to households linked to ‘conditional-
ities’ including attendance at community meetings and
uptake of government health services. These are primar-
ily focused on child health and development but some
schemes include maternity care uptake. Unconditional
cash transfers are similar regular payments but, in the
absence of specific conditionalities for service utilisation,
have the more general aim of alleviating the effect of
poverty on a woman’s health during pregnancy. Short-
term cash payments to offset costs are typically retro-
spective payments made at government health facilities
to those who attend for care. Vouchers for maternity
care services aim to reduce the cost of maternity care
services and vouchers for ‘merit’ goods aim to reduce the
cost of merit goods (such as food or insecticide-treated
nets) that promote maternal health. Vouchers may be
distributed by community-based workers or at health
facilities, and voucher schemes may be designed to
incorporate services in the private sector as well as
government facilities.
There have been seven systematic reviews of evidence
on the impact of DSF mechanisms on maternal health
during the period 2007–2012 [7–13]. Two of the reviews
examined the impact of cash transfers [9, 11], three the
impact of vouchers [8, 12, 13], and two the role of mul-
tiple types of DSF [7, 10]. The systematic reviews reported
on a rapidly growing body of evidence that DSF can lead
to a short-term increase in uptake of maternity care
services, but could offer little evidence on longer-term
effects on service uptake or maternal and neonatal
morbidity and mortality. A recently published systematic
review has confirmed these findings [14].
This article has been commissioned by the World
Health Organization’s Department of Maternal, Newborn,
Child and Adolescent Health as part of a series of articles
on health promotion interventions. The series aims to
document factors that affect programme implementation
in order to support policy-makers and decisions on how
best to improve access to skilled care during pregnancy,
childbirth and after birth. This article focuses on factors
that have been found to affect implementation of DSF
programmes in maternal and newborn health and has
three components: a review of stakeholder perspectives
and experiences of DSF interventions; information on the
barriers and facilitators to implementation of the interven-
tions, and a discussion on how these relate to the im-
provements in care-seeking outcomes reported elsewhere
and what this means for programmatic initiatives [14].
Methods
This article is a secondary analysis of studies identified
in a systematic review that was conducted in 2012 [6, 7]
and repeated in 2015 [14]. The systematic review used
the Joanna Briggs Institute approach, which incorporates
both quantitative and qualitative data into reviews and
has been used to review evidence on a range of policy
and healthcare systems topics [15]. The population of
interest in the review was economically poor women
who were pregnant or within 42 days of end of
pregnancy, in the context of low- and middle-income
(both lower- and upper-middle) countries as defined by
the World Bank at the time the study was published.
The intervention of interest was DSF as a mechanism to
increase consumption of goods and services intended to
impact positively on maternal and newborn health. Out-
comes of interest in the systematic review related to the
effectiveness of DSF programmes to promote uptake of
maternity care services and maternal and newborn
health, and wider impact on quality of care. In addition
to questions of effectiveness, the 2012 review also
analysed qualitative research relating to barriers and fa-
cilitators for effective and sustainable programme
implementation.
The systematic searches for the review used 30 terms
in 19 medical, health and social policy databases and
seven databases of unpublished research, and aimed to
retrieve quantitative and qualitative studies that were
published between January 1990 and June 2015.
Retrieved studies were examined using Joanna Briggs
Institute tools for critical appraisal of quantitative and
qualitative research that include questions on study
methods and the presentation of findings [15]. The
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review team assigned an overall quality rating to individual
studies using a three-point rating system (low-, medium-
or high-quality), similar to that used to assess study bias
in the Effective Public Health Practice Project (EPHPP)
quality assessment tool. The rating assigned to each study
was based on assessments of study methods and reporting
using critical appraisal tools produced by the Joanna
Briggs Institute. The assessments are described in detail in
a linked systematic review [14].
Data were extracted from included studies using
standardised tools developed by the Joanna Briggs Insti-
tute, and the findings presented in this article have been
analysed thematically using a comprehensive framework
for factors affecting implementation of health promotion
interventions, adapted from the SURE (Supporting the
Use of Research Evidence) framework for preparing policy
briefs [16]. The analytical framework, which is described
in detail in a paper by Smith et al. in this series, includes
five ‘levels’ of factors that affect policy implementation
(main stakeholders in communities, healthcare providers,
other stakeholders, health service delivery factors and so-
cial and political factors) and provides a list of types of
barrier and enabler for each level. One of the authors,
BMH, read through all included studies and extracted data
relating to each level of the framework, then both authors
examined the extracted data and re-organised them into
themes based on the list of types of barrier and enabler.
Results
Range and quality of the body of literature
The article includes findings from 49 quantitative studies
and from an additional 49 qualitative studies that con-
tained information relevant to the quantitative studies
(see Table 1 for details of included studies) that relate to
the five types of DSF in 22 country programmes:
 conditional cash transfers (Brazil’s Bolsa Familia
[17, 18], El Salvador’s Comunidades Solidarias
Rurales [19], Guatemala’s Mi Familia Progresa
[20], Programa de Asignación Familia in
Honduras [21], the Muthulakshmi Reddy
Maternity Benefit Scheme in India [22, 23],
Indonesia’s Program Keluarga Harapan [24–26],
Mexico’s Oportunidades [27–34], and Plan de
Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social
(PANES) in Uruguay [35]);
 unconditional cash transfers (Zambia’s Child Grant
Programme [36]);
 short-term cash payments to offset costs
(CHIMACA in China [37], India’s Janani Suraksha
Yojana [38–74], the Safe Delivery Incentive
Programme in Nepal [75–77] and the SURE-P
programme in Nigeria [78]);
 vouchers for maternity care services (Bangladesh’s
Maternal Health Voucher Scheme [79–84], a pilot
programme in Bangladesh [85], a voucher
programme in Cambodia [86, 87], the Chiranjeevi
Yojana in India [88–92], Kenya’s Vouchers for
Health programme [93–102], pilot programmes in
Pakistan [103, 104], and the HealthyBaby vouchers
[105, 106] and Mekerere University Voucher
Scheme in Uganda [107, 108]), and vouchers for
merit goods (the Tanzanian National Voucher
Scheme [109–111]).
Programmes ranged from small-scale pilot voucher
schemes in Pakistan and Bangladesh to large national
programmes such as Janani Suraksha Yojana in India,
Bangladesh’s Maternal Health Voucher Scheme and
multiple conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin
American countries. Programme design varied from
those that were purely demand-side to those that
included supply-side incentives such as output-based
payments to service providers (for example many of the
voucher programmes), or incentives for community-
based workers (such as in India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana).
Funding for programmes has come from national and
state governments or from donor organisations such as
the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ),
the UK Department for International Development and
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
The studies were generally of medium quality. Many of
the quantitative studies were conducted early in the im-
plementation of programmes and some made only limited
efforts to account for confounding factors. Qualitative
studies were often part of larger programme evaluations
that focused primarily on quantitative outcomes and some
of the articles reporting these findings lacked detailed de-
scriptions of the methods used to collect and analyse data.
Despite these limitations an overview of this literature
does offer insights into the programmatic processes across
a wide range of DSF initiatives and allows us to identify
common features across programmes as well as some
programme specific challenges.
Stakeholder perspectives and experiences
Three groups of stakeholders in DSF programmes have
been studied in most detail: women service users,
community-based workers, and staff in health facilities.
Documented experiences from each of these groups are
reviewed below and relate to awareness of programmes,
cultural attitudes, perceptions of maternity care services,
reasons for using or joining programmes and the chal-
lenges faced during participation. Many findings reflect
wider issues in healthcare systems, however this section
focuses on DSF implementation, and findings have been
disaggregated by type of DSF where possible.
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Women who are potential DSF programme users
Target groups may be unaware of programme details
[24, 25, 41, 46, 50, 58, 59, 61, 63, 64, 67, 71, 76, 77, 81,
85, 89, 91, 98, 101]. Women and their families may not
realise that they are eligible for programmes (or incor-
rectly think that they are) and may not know which fa-
cilities they can use through the scheme [48, 63].
Remote areas may be less likely to receive promotional
activities [93, 101]. Effective forms of awareness gene-
ration have included community dissemination of infor-
mation [81], radio broadcasts [93], and networks of
women’s groups [19, 28, 29, 77].
Social and cultural attitudes towards women play an
important role in utility of vouchers as well as in use of
services. Some women reported not being able to use a
voucher because their husband did not want to be la-
belled as poor [98, 105], because they were expected to
return to a family home elsewhere to give birth [105], or
because nobody was available to accompany them to a
participating hospital [63, 71, 85]. Of those who did
travel to facility for birth care, many sought early
discharge in order to return to look after children [52].
Perceptions of the quality of care and behaviour of pro-
viders were important for utilisation of health services,
and therefore the implementation of DSF schemes. Pro-
spective users were discouraged by reputations that facil-
ities had long waiting times [81, 85], were poorly equipped
and unclean [39, 49, 58, 61, 63, 65, 71, 80, 85, 92], or were
places where one encountered disrespectful and abusive
care [33, 44, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56, 61, 63, 81, 86, 94, 101, 105].
Modesty rules made some women reluctant to be treated
by male doctors [58] or to visit midwives where it is con-
sidered inappropriate to let someone else see one’s genitals
[25]. Other deterrents included fear of being subjected to
unwanted procedures such as injections, surgical proce-
dures and stitches [61, 71, 72] and of testing for HIV at a
health facility and the attached stigma of HIV [98, 101].
Regular antenatal care visits may help women to become
familiar and more relaxed with facilities and staff [52], and
community visits by staff and women who were satisfied
with their care could promote uptake [71, 73].
Community-based workers
Workers based in communities (including voucher
distributors) can be important facilitators for DSF pro-
grammes. India’s accredited social health activists
(ASHA) were found to be have played an important role
in raising the awareness of Janani Suraksha Yojana and
assisting women to obtain payments [38, 39, 52, 56, 58,
63, 64, 68–70, 72, 112], as did workers for Program
Keluarga Harapan in Indonesia [24, 25]. Community
health workers were an important source of information
on DSF programmes in India [64, 88] and Tanzania
[109], and voucher distributors performed a similar role
in Kenya [99], Pakistan [103, 104] and Cambodia [87].
Community-based workers occupy a challenging pos-
ition between communities, DSF programmes and health
facilities. In communities, they can face criticism and
accusations of theft if cash transfer payments are delayed
[23], or if women go to a facility to give birth but do not
receive payments they had been told about, or receive a
smaller amount than expected [49, 56, 58, 65]. When
visiting facilities, community-based workers who are re-
imbursed for facilitating DSF programmes may be asked
for informal payments by facility staff [50, 56]. They may
be used as go-betweens to request money from families
on behalf of service providers and service providers have
reportedly punished those who resist by refusing to
register the facilitator’s subsequent service users, refer-
ring them to other facilities unnecessarily, or withhol-
ding DSF payments [44, 50, 56]. In some cases women
have been reluctant to allow workers to accompany
them to a facility because they feared money would be
taken from them [48].
The potential of community-based workers to implement
DSF programmes can also be undermined by geographic-
ally over-large operating areas that entail long distances for
travel [25]. Some female workers were restricted by their
family members in when they could accompany pregnant
women to a facility [56]. Some workers’ usefulness was
limited by their poor knowledge of programme details [53]
and others reported difficulties in applying eligibility criteria
because their guidelines were not clear [23]. Financial issues
included resistance to their continued work for the
programme from their families if their payment was de-
layed [56], and having to pay for food and transport when
accompanying a women for antenatal care yet not receiving
any reimbursement if the woman later gave birth at home
[47, 56, 58]. Other difficulties include the risks of co-option
of schemes by community members for personal gain. Posi-
tions as programme workers are sometimes regarded by
communities as ‘lucrative’ compared to other forms of work
[44], and there have been reports of recruitment processes
being hijacked by local politicians and community leaders
to appoint family members even though they were unlikely
to want to perform the necessary duties [48, 65].
Staff in health facilities
Experiences among service providers and managers at
participating health facilities seem to be mixed. In
evaluations of voucher schemes, government and pri-
vate providers report gaining skills and experience,
making investments in infrastructure, being able to
hire more staff, and reduced absenteeism among
existing staff [86, 106, 108]. However, staff at some
facilities in voucher schemes felt that increased user-
load and administrative work was not adequately
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compensated by provider payments [79, 82, 106]. Some
felt that schemes designed to target specific groups
created problems and complained that they had been
threatened by women who were excluded by means-
testing criteria [81], or subjected to pressure from local
politicians to distribute vouchers to ineligible women [81].
In short-term cash payment programmes, service
providers at government facilities reported a signifi-
cant increase in their workload exacerbating the exis-
ting inadequacies of services [40, 46, 50, 54, 59, 61].
Knowledge of schemes varied. Some government
providers in India admitted that they knew nothing
about Janani Suraksha Yojana other than that they
needed to give payments to women who gave birth in
the facility [54, 59]. One study reported that women
were treated with hostility by facility staff when they
sought cash assistance [54]. On the other hand, de-
layed or irregular reimbursements by programmes
could lead to difficulties distributing money to women
and expose the service providers as targets for criti-
cism from families [48, 76].
In programmes designed to allow opt-in of private pro-
viders, respondents reported that they joined to help the
poor to access health services [81, 90, 91] and conversely to
increase business [81, 90]. In one study some said they felt
coerced, fearing that they would otherwise be subjected to
unwarranted but damaging investigations [90]. Private pro-
viders reported subsequently dropping out of voucher
schemes because they felt ‘overwhelmed’ by the number of
voucher users [93], or were unhappy with inadequate and
delayed payments [108]. Some private providers in the
Chiranjeevi Scheme in India reported that revenue had
fallen because there were too few voucher users, their facil-
ity had gained an unwanted reputation as a place for poor
people, and that pregnant women who used to pay fees to
be attended there were now using the voucher programme
[90]. Providers in the Tanzanian National Voucher
Scheme for insecticide-treated nets stated that they
enjoyed participating but that the programme required
substantial investment of money and storage space to
stock slow-selling nets, at the expense of other more
popular items such as soap [110].
Barriers and facilitators to successful implementation
Seven themes were identified regarding barriers and enab-
ling factors for the implementation of DSF programmes:
scope of the programme, supply-side capacity, contracting
private providers, administrative processes and procedural
considerations, information systems, fraudulent practices
and their control, and sustainability issues.
Scope of the programme
A common barrier found across many DSF programmes
was that they were insufficient in their scope to overcome
continued financial, social and geographical barriers to
accessing services. Vouchers for maternity care services
typically cover treatment costs but many do not include
other important ‘demand-side’ costs such as transport,
which can be prohibitive for households [79, 85, 88, 92,
96, 98–101, 104–106]. There is also the opportunity cost
for women and their families of spending time away from
their home and children [86, 103]. In contexts where preg-
nant women are asked to buy vouchers, for example the
Vouchers for Health programme in Kenya, women may
be deterred by the price of vouchers [96, 100]. Experiences
with vouchers for merit goods in Tanzania have been
similar. Women highlighted the cost of travel to obtain a
voucher from health facilities, the cost of travelling to an
approved shop to use the voucher and the remaining cost
of the insecticide-treated net (which was only part-
subsidised by a voucher) [109, 111].
Possible options to increase the accessibility of voucher
services include, inclusion of travel costs within voucher
entitlements [80, 81, 85, 100, 107], community distribu-
tion of vouchers to reduce travel to obtain a voucher and
accreditation of additional facilities and providers to
reduce travel to make use of a voucher [105]. For example,
the Maternal Health Voucher Scheme in Bangladesh
included short-term cash payments to facilitate uptake by
offsetting costs of access [79].
In short-term payment programmes and in cash trans-
fer schemes, payments may simply be too small or too
late to offset out-of-pocket costs that include transport,
tests, medicines and sutures [23, 25, 33, 37, 44, 46–49,
54, 55, 58–61, 66, 67, 77]. The size of payments may
need to be increased periodically to keep pace with infla-
tion and the Muthulakshmi Reddy Maternity Benefit
Scheme in India has repeatedly increased the amount
paid to women during its 30 year implementation period
[22]. The programme offered 300 rupees to eligible
women when launched in 1987 and now offers 12,000
rupees (approximately USD 190).
Provisions for onward referral in the case of an obstetric
complication have often not been included in DSF schemes
yet should be considered (see also sections on supply-side
capacity and on procedural considerations below). Some
families reported having to pay for treatment costs after
they were referred to a non-participating facility [101], and
others returned home when faced with additional expend-
iture [54, 66]. Bangladesh’s Maternal Health Voucher
Scheme included ‘seed funds’ that could be used by health
facilities for supply-side investments and to pay for
emergency transport for voucher users [81].
Narrow eligibility criteria were highlighted as a barrier
by studies of many DSF programmes. For example,
schemes that exclude women who have more than a cer-
tain number of children are reported as unfair, difficult to
enforce and completely counter-intuitive for programmes
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that aim to reduce maternal mortality [22, 76, 79, 82]. If a
decision is made to design a targeted programme then use
of locally appropriate poverty screening tools should be
considered [94, 95, 98, 99, 101, 106]. Programmes in India
have often used an existing system of ‘below poverty line’
cards however such programmes are constrained by any
pitfalls in the existing system such as non-ownership of
cards by those in need but lacking documentation, and
leakage of cards to those least in need [88].
Supply-side capacity
The contextual evidence highlights that DSF cannot work
well without adequate supply-side investment in public
services and systems, and many of the findings in this
sub-section are indicative of wider challenges in health-
care systems. Many evaluations of DSF programmes
described problems at health facilities as a key barrier.
Poor availability of medicines and other medical supplies
– sometimes linked to bureaucratic procedures for pro-
curement that discourage restocking [48] – meant that
women in Bangladesh and India needed to make consider-
able personal expenditure [81, 82, 85]. Bed shortages
meant many women were discharged within 24 h of giving
birth, which may not allow sufficient time for post-partum
care [46, 48]. In Indonesia’s Program Keluarga Harapan,
cash transfers were contingent on using midwives how-
ever village midwife posts were reported to be unfilled in
many areas [25]. Contracting private providers in voucher
schemes does not remove the need for quality public sec-
tor provision as private providers often refer complicated
cases to the public sector [105].
In India, where DSF schemes can be found in many
states, there have been widespread reports of poor qua-
lity of care and improper practices, linked to increased
workloads of staff in health facilities [40, 55, 60, 63]. It is
important to monitor quality of care and adverse out-
comes after childbirth, however DSF programmes were
reported to lack adequate monitoring systems in this
area [45, 46, 50] and women reported having no way to
register and process their complaints at health facilities
[50, 66]. Incidents included delays in starting treatment
for women with serious conditions [66], chaotic delivery
rooms [40], low utilisation of partographs [43], babies
being left unmonitored in birth pans [44], physical abuse
of women [44, 66], episiotomies conducted without per-
mission and stitched without local anaesthesia [44], high
incidence of oxytocin injections for labour induction
[45], and pregnant women who have been diverted from
a public to a private facility at the behest of an owner
who worked on-call at the public facility [41].
Referrals from one facility to another are a key issue
that may put the life of the woman and her baby at risk
and are a cause of substantial expenditure for families
who face additional costs for transport, food and
accommodation [41, 45, 50, 53, 54, 66, 70, 76, 79].
Reported reasons for referral related to wider healthcare
systems issues including absence of specialists at lower
level facilities [42, 50, 59, 79], busy or absent doctors
and midwives [49, 50, 58, 62, 66, 67], and a lack of func-
tioning equipment for operations or blood transfusions
(including faulty or stolen generators) [40, 48, 50, 65, 91].
In India, private practitioners in the Chiranjeevi Yojana
were reluctant to provide care for clusters of women re-
quiring care for complications due to the associated costs
and the risk of adverse outcomes [90, 91].
There are two key enabling factors for programme
designers and managers to support facilities and pro-
mote care-seeking. Firstly, designers need to realistically
examine the capacity of local health systems to provide
care to women who use DSF programmes. This needs to
include emergency transport [62], round-the-clock
opening hours [38, 60] and clearly stated guidelines for
onward referrals [45, 50, 66, 69]. Procurement systems
for essential medicines may need to be included within
programme designs, at least until government procure-
ment systems can be adequately strengthened [101].
Secondly, designers may consider how best to support
participating facilities to maintain and improve the quality
of care. Concurrent supply-side investments can improve
working conditions for staff and expand service coverage,
and ‘seed funds’ have reportedly been used to good effect in
Bangladesh’s Maternal Health Voucher Scheme [81]. El
Salvador’s Comunidades Solidarias Rurales and Guatemala’s
Mi Familia Progresa were reported to have been imple-
mented successfully alongside investments in the infra-
structure and human resources of health facilities [19, 20],
and similar supply-side investments have been important in
India [38, 60] and Nigeria [78]. Another approach that has
been advocated is to link provider payments to uptake of
services [77, 87, 94, 107]. For programmes using govern-
ment facilities (including if they are used for onward refer-
rals), it is important that government facilities receive any
linked payments and are able to invest them in infrastruc-
ture and human resources [93, 101, 105]
Contracting private providers
For programmes that are designed to include the opt-in of
private providers, there is a risk that programmes will
struggle to maintain sufficient number of participating
providers if revenue from service users is considered to be
inadequate [90, 91, 93, 101]. Providers and programme
managers have reported that attempts to contract private
providers to implement Janani Suraksha Yojana in some
Indian states struggled due to low provider payments [42]
and lack of interested providers that meet accreditation
criteria [68].
Four particular issues have been documented for the
contracting of private providers in voucher programmes.
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Firstly, providers may deliver differential treatment to
voucher users compared to fee-paying pregnant women
[93, 98]. Secondly, providers may seek to increase rev-
enue by charging pregnant women for services that
should be provided free according to the DSF scheme
guidelines and agreements, including ultrasound scans,
medicines and surgical care [88, 91, 92]. Thirdly, some
providers may engage in the ‘skimming’ of voucher users
requiring little intervention and referral of those requir-
ing operations to avoid incurring costs [90, 91], or avoid
the risk (and associated litigation) of being held respon-
sible for any adverse outcomes [90]. Fourthly, providers
may withdraw from a programme [89, 90, 93, 108].
Programme designers could consider how best to
reimburse private facilities for childbirth. As noted
above, private facilities may be reluctant to perform
surgical interventions if reimbursements are the same
regardless of level of intervention [90, 91], and
programme officials in India suggested that provider
contracts should include a clause stating that caesar-
ean sections must be provided to any voucher user
who needed one. Conversely, there are fears that
differential reimbursement rates may provide an in-
centive for participating private facilities to perform
high rates of caesarean sections, and that close
monitoring may be an important deterrent [83].
Administrative processes and procedural considerations
Requirements for formal documents to be produced
in order to prove eligibility should be carefully con-
sidered as in some cases the undocumented will be
those most in need, including migrants, young and
multiparous women [22, 41, 50, 53, 55, 58, 76, 94,
101]. In Kenya, for instance, young women were
effectively excluded from a voucher scheme as the re-
quired government identification cards are only issued
at 18 years of age [101]. It may be necessary to allow
alternative forms of evidence (such as photos or let-
ters signed by community leaders) [46], or to avoid
restrictions and requirements for formal documents
altogether [41, 46, 53].
For short-term cash payment programmes, rigid
insistence on bureaucratic processes is a barrier to
payment claims by women and some women did not
travel to a facility for childbirth if they had heard re-
ports other women had been denied money [48, 49].
The distribution of payments was considered to lack
transparency [46, 58], and respondents reported be-
ing repeatedly sent away from facilities to obtain
additional documents [41, 76]. Payments have been
denied for reasons including because a seven-day
claim period had passed, women were more than
12 weeks gestation at the time of registration, an
official would not approve payments to women who
gave birth before he took his post, a woman had
given birth on the way to a facility and a woman
was not accompanied by a community-based worker
[41, 48, 68, 76].
It is important that payments to users and participa-
ting facilities in DSF programmes use streamlined and
timely systems. For short-term cash payment pro-
grammes, women received payments as late as
12 months after giving birth [46], or not at all [76], and
some families reported selling possessions or incurring
debts to pay for transport and medicines for childbirth
[47]. Service providers have suggested that such pay-
ments to women should be made before childbirth [71],
however this may not be enough to overcome irregular
disbursements of funding to local levels [41, 42, 58, 72].
The distribution of payments to users can be an admin-
istrative burden for officials and service providers, who
may not fully understand the programme [58, 59]. Some
service providers highlighted a need for more support to
cope with paperwork [59, 67], while others had restricted
payments to a specific desk at a certain time of day to
cope with demand for payments [59]. Local officials
suggested that community health workers who manage
accounts and distribute payments should be trained
accordingly [68, 69].
Payments to health facilities have reportedly been
delayed due to bureaucratic procedures and a lack of un-
derstanding among facility staff regarding what supporting
documentation must be submitted [82, 90, 93, 97, 101].
Stringent fraud detection systems may cause delays [106],
but need to be balanced against the effects of fraud (see
section on corruption). Providers can benefit from feed-
back mechanisms on how to make payment claims [93].
District officials reacted to unpredictability in funding by
adopting first come, first served approaches, sharing
smaller amounts among women, borrowing money from
other sources, or using their own money [76].
Information systems
In targeted DSF programmes, information on target
groups can help to inform locally appropriate poverty
screening tools but may be difficult to obtain or use
[94, 95, 98, 99, 101, 106]. Use of existing government
systems for monitoring helps to reduce duplication
[81, 82, 84], however these need to be functional –
district officials in India and Nepal reported not
having time, resources or guidelines to conduct moni-
toring visits [59, 76] and stated that they had to
assume quality of care was good unless they heard
otherwise [68]. An alternative approach advocated by
studies in the review was for communities and non-
governmental organisations to be supported to
monitor quality of care, provision of free services and
Hunter and Murray BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth  (2017) 17:262 Page 19 of 28
distribution of vouchers or cash transfers [45, 70].
Another suggested approach was to contract monitor-
ing to an external organisation, although experiences
with Kenya’s Vouchers for Health programme indi-
cated that close scrutiny was needed to ensure that the
contracted organisation performed monitoring processes
as mandated [95, 101]. Such external oversight will also
require additional financial outlay and may cause tensions
within health services and administrations.
Fraudulent practices and their control
Fraudulent practices (by users, community-based
workers and providers) have been documented as occur-
ring in many DSF programmes. Local government offi-
cials may attempt to use programmes to get care for
ineligible family members and friends [90], and officials
in India and Nepal are reported to have embezzled
programme funds [44, 76]. A recurring complaint across
many short-term cash payment and voucher schemes is
that families have been exposed to demands for informal
payments by staff in health facilities [39, 44, 45, 47, 48,
50, 56, 60, 63, 77, 86, 93, 101]. In short-term cash pay-
ment programmes, staff have been known to deduct
money before giving the scheduled payments [44, 46, 53,
59, 63], and indeed one study in India reported that
around half of the amount due to be paid to women
through Janani Suraksha Yojana was deducted by service
providers [44]. Suggestions from officials include using
pre-printed cheques and tracking these using online
financial reporting systems [58, 70].
Community-based workers have also been known to
apply informal charges to women and their families
[44, 86, 93, 101]. Commission-based (rather than
salaried) payments for such workers may have unin-
tended consequences including workers placing in-
appropriate pressure on women to travel to health
centres to give birth [53], and issuing vouchers to
ineligible women in order to achieve the requisite
numbers [93]. Initiatives taken by programme
managers in Kenya to reduce dishonest behaviour in-
cluded putting up posters with the true cost of
vouchers on market days to prevent informal fees,
and switching from commission-based to stipend-
based payments for voucher distributors [93].
Some studies have emphasised the importance of
strong monitoring systems [106, 108]. If false claims are
reported sufficient resources need to be allocated so that
they can be adequately followed-up [76]. Similarly, it is
important to be able to remove providers from a
programme if they are found to be engaged in malprac-
tice [106], although in practice this may be difficult in
districts where there are few providers or little interest
in joining a programme.
Sustainability issues
The experience with DSF programmes ranges from
cash transfers that have been in operation for almost
30 years, to voucher programmes that have only been
implemented as short pilot programmes. Thorough
planning and political support seem important for the
sustainability of DSF programmes and programme
designers need to ensure that all organisations in-
volved in the programme have sufficient capacity to
perform mandated tasks [59, 78, 81, 95]. Research has
emphasised the importance of good communication
between the different levels and different
organisations [68, 77, 93]. Planning may take several
years as appropriate systems and expertise are devel-
oped, and this may be an expensive process [24, 78].
Data should be monitored during implementation to
adjust programme design as needed [93, 95]. Local
government officials, community leaders and
community-based workers can play an important role
raising awareness of programmes [55, 81, 84, 101],
however regular communication is needed as turnover
of officials and poor communication between levels
may lead to confusion and distribution of misinforma-
tion [79, 81, 84, 106].
Policy champions in donor and governmental organisa-
tions proved helpful to ensure political and financial sup-
port for programmes in Kenya and Uganda [93, 101, 106].
In Kenya the Vouchers for Health programme reportedly
received support from national policy-makers because it
was seen as a useful model to prepare for a national social
health insurance programme [93]. However, programmes
may also become subject to specific political interests. In
Nepal, the national government reportedly forced
programme roll-out before planning was complete and
created tensions with state governments [76].
Ministry of Health engagement is often sought in
donor-initiated programmes [84, 101], but programmes
may become an administrative burden for under-
resourced departments and facilities [81, 84]. In Kenya, a
planned transfer of ownership to the Ministry of Health
was repeatedly delayed and eventually required the assist-
ance of a contracted consultancy firm [93].
Discussion
This analysis has highlighted a series of well-documented
challenges for the implementation of DSF schemes in
maternal and newborn health. These include issues of
programme scope (in terms of programme eligibility,
size and timing of payments and voucher entitle-
ments), wider problems in healthcare systems (inclu-
ding inadequate infrastructure and human resources,
lack of medicines and problems with corruption) and
the population’s awareness and perceptions of
programmes and health services. A recent systematic
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review concluded that despite evaluations spanning
15 years of implementation, DSF programmes have
yet to demonstrate positive impact of programmes on
quality of care or maternal and newborn health out-
comes [14]. That finding may reflect insufficient at-
tention during programme design and implementation
to improving the quality of care being provided and
to conditions of access to comprehensive emergency
care [113]. Research highlighted in our analysis indi-
cates that the implementation of DSF programmes
may reinforce existing healthcare system problems in-
cluding poor quality of care, demands for informal
fees and the systematic exclusion of vulnerable
groups. Vouchers for maternity care services are often
proposed as a means to improve quality of care how-
ever experiences indicate private providers may find
reimbursement rates to be unattractive and engage in
practices such as providing differential quality of care
or ‘skimming’ programme users who require minimal
intervention. Taken together, these findings suggest a
need for greater attention to issues of implementation
in DSF programmes and to the context in which they
are to be introduced. They indicate serious concerns
for the use of DSF as a stand-alone interventions in
maternal and newborn health in low- and middle-
income countries, and raise questions regarding which
(if any) maternal and newborn healthcare services are
suited to modalities of DSF.
Where DSF programmes have improved care-seeking,
the programmes have tended to include (or be accompan-
ied by) additional investment in health facilities or staff,
while those without such investment have struggled (see
Tables 2 and 3). Other important factors that have enabled
DSF programmes to improve care-seeking have included
appropriate payment size and timing for short-term cash
payments and cash transfer programmes, and an adequate
package of entitlements (including transport costs) in
voucher schemes. When well-supported and -supervised,
community-based workers, leaders and women’s groups
have been important facilitators for programmes as they
have raised awareness of programme details and helped to
counter negative perceptions of programmes.
The longest-running DSF programmes included in
this review have been cash transfer schemes that were
introduced by national or state governments as part
of wider social welfare programmes. Programmes
since the launch of the Millennium Development
Goals have tended to focus more narrowly on specific
maternal health services with the aim to improve
their coverage on indicators such as skilled attendants
at birth or facility births. Most evaluations have
shown quantitative improvements in coverage rates
[14]. However, many have relied on funding from do-
nors, and some were implemented for only short pilot
periods. Studies have highlighted the high start-up
costs of DSF programmes [24, 78], and those running
in parallel to welfare systems are likely to have con-
tinued high overhead costs. Policy-makers need to
consider whether DSF programmes that involve cash
payments or vouchers are likely to be an optimal use
of resources, or whether increased supply-side invest-
ment would be equally effective.
Limitations of the review
The scope of literature included systematic review may
have been limited by use of English search terms and
English language databases. Findings were incorporated
from a range of studies, including some that were of low
quality, in order to gain insights for implementation from
a wide range of contexts. The most common methodo-
logical weaknesses of studies related to the length of time
for follow-up after programme initiation (quantitative
studies), and failure to address to role of the researcher on
data generation and analysis (qualitative studies). By in-
cluding studies with such weaknesses, there is a risk that
findings reported in this review over-emphasise short-
term factors affecting implementation, and that findings
are subject to unknown biases based on the value systems
and social positioning of researchers.
Conclusions
After quite widespread implementation and consider-
able policy enthusiasm in some quarters, evaluations
have shed light on the importance of a number of de-
tailed design and implementation issues as outlined
above. The synthesis of findings reveals a complex
picture of experiences DSF programmes in maternal
and newborn health. While they indicate that cash
payments and vouchers can be successful in improv-
ing service utilisation rates at least in the short term
in an array of contexts, there are frequent concerns
about inclusion criteria or distribution mechanisms
that effectively exclude migrants, young and multipar-
ous women, about staff charging informal fees once
at the facilities, and about the struggle to maintain
quality of care under greater demand. Unsurprisingly,
the programmes that have successfully promoted
uptake of specific maternity care services using cash
or voucher incentives, such as Nepal’s Safe Delivery
Incentive Programme and Bangladesh’s Maternal
Health Voucher Scheme, are those which were care-
fully designed with adequate scope (in terms of
programme eligibility, payment size and timing, or
services and goods to which they provide entitlement)
to properly address maternal and newborn health
aims, were well-supported in communities and/or
which operated within effective healthcare systems.
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Table 2 Summary of key findings from quantitative studies on short-term cash payments and cash transfers
Programme Effect on care-seeking outcomesa Key findings from synthesis of factors influencing implementation
Enablers Barriers
Conditional cash transfers
Comunidades Solidarias Rurales,
El Salvador
Increased skilled birth attendance
and facility births. No effect on
antenatal care and postnatal care
-Awareness generation during
monthly meetings [19]
-Concurrent investments in
health facility infrastructure and
recruitment of health workers
[19]
-Payments made to women
(not their husbands) [19]
None stated
Mi Familia Progresa, Guatemala Increased antenatal care. No
effect on facility births
-Concurrent investments in
health facility infrastructure and
recruitment of health workers
[20]
None stated
Programa de Asignación Familia,
Honduras
Increased antenatal care. No
effect on postnatal care
-Conditionalities to submit
paperwork at health facilities
[21]
-Poor awareness among women
of programme conditionalities
[21]
Muthulakshmi Reddy Maternity
Benefit Scheme, India
Associated with use of public
facilities for antenatal care and
childbirth
-Increased total amount of
payments [22]
-Delays in receipt of money for
women [22]
-Overly bureaucratic process for
determining eligibility [22]
-Eligibility criteria that restrict
payments to women for her first
or second live birth [22]
Program Keluarga Harapan,
Indonesia
Increased antenatal and
postnatal care. Mixed picture of
positive and no effect on skilled
birth attendance. No effect on
facility births
-Awareness generation by
community-based workers
[24]
-Poor awareness of the
programme among target
groups [24]
-Delays in receipt of money for
women [24]
-Failure to implement verification
systems to penalise households
that do not meet
conditionalities [24]
-Poor availability of midwives [26]
-High start-up costs [24]
Oportunidades, Mexico Mixed picture of positive and no
effect on skilled birth attendance.
No effect on antenatal care
-Awareness generation during
monthly meetings [28, 29]
-Perceived poor behaviour of
staff at participating hospitals
[33]
-Attitudes towards formal
maternity care services of family
members who do not attend
monthly meetings [34]
-Distance to participating
facilities [33]
-Cost of travel to health facilities
[33]
-Lack of concurrent investment
in health facilities [28, 29]
Plan de Atención Nacional a la
Emergencia Social (PANES),
Uruguay
Increased antenatal care. No
effect on skilled attendance at
birth.
-Conditionalities for antenatal
care were not enforced [35]
-Conditionalities for antenatal
care were not enforced [35]
Unconditional cash transfers
Child Grant Programme, Zambia No effect on skilled birth
attendance or antenatal care
None stated -Lack of concurrent investment
in health facilities [36]
Short-term cash payments
CHIMACA programme, China No effect on antenatal care or
postnatal care
None stated -Payment too small [37]
-Overly difficult process for
claiming money [37]
Janani Suraksha Yojana, India Increased skilled birth attendance
and facility births. Mixed picture
of positive, negative and no
-Awareness generation by
community-based workers
[38, 39]
-Poor awareness of the
programme among target
groups [63]
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Research is still needed in a number of areas and
the opportunity to update our original systematic re-
view has reminded us of the narrow range of issues
and indicators included in many evaluations of DSF
programmes. Review papers on this topic are at risk
of tunnel vision as a result. It is our considered view
that after almost 15 years of evaluating DSF schemes
there are some questions about the DSF approach
which are important but rarely posed. For example,
we found no evaluations that attempted to gauge the
Table 2 Summary of key findings from quantitative studies on short-term cash payments and cash transfers (Continued)
effect on antenatal care and
postnatal care
-Round-the-clock opening of
health facilities [38, 60]
-Emergency transport
programmes [62]
-Accreditation of remote health
facilities to reduce travel
distances [55]
-Active involvement of state and
district officials [55]
-Detailed implementation plans
[38]
-Distance and lack of transport
to participating facilities [55, 60]
-Payments not made until after
childbirth, thereby reducing
incentive for antenatal care
[55, 62]
-Delays in receipt of money for
women [39, 51, 55, 60, 63]
-Demands for additional or
informal payments [39, 60, 63]
-Perceived poor quality of care
at participating facilities [39]
-Overly bureaucratic process for
determining eligibility [55]
-Inappropriate proxy measures
of poverty, such as caste [38]
-Women who travel to another
area to give birth [51]
-Delays in recruitment of
community-based workers [39]
-Poor awareness of the existence
of community-based workers
[63]
-Delays in payments for
community-based workers [55]
-Increased workloads and
reduced quality of care at
participating health facilities
[55, 62, 63]
-Lack of trained midwives [62]
-Existence of a similar
programme – the National
Maternity Benefit Scheme [55]
Safe Delivery Incentive
Programme, Nepal
Increased antenatal care. Mixed
picture of positive or no effect
on skilled birth attendance and
facility births
-Awareness generation by
women’s groups in communities
[77]
-Lack of geographical barriers in
the study district [77]
-Universal eligibility [77]
-Output-based reimbursements
for providers [77]
-Poor awareness of the
programme among target
groups [77]
-Delays in receipt of money for
women [77]
-Payments not sufficient to cover
treatment costs [77]
-Demands for additional or
informal payments [77]
-Overly difficult process for
claiming money [77]
-Confusion amongst health
workers and officials regarding
eligibility criteria, sharing of
health worker incentives and
payment mechanisms for
women [77]
SURE-P programme, Nigeria No effect on skilled birth
attendance or antenatal care
-Prompt payments to pregnant
women [78]
-Defined roles and contracts for
local banks and for organisations
that will develop information
systems [78]
-Concurrent programmes to
expand availability of maternity
care services [78]
-Increased workload at
participating health facilities [78]
-High start-up costs including
research, advocacy, development
of information systems,
recruitment of workers for data
collection and the logistics and
security of payments to pregnant
women [78]
aSee systematic review for further details of effect on care-seeking outcomes [14]
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Table 3 Summary of key findings from quantitative studies on vouchers
Programme Effect on care-seeking outcomes
a
Key findings from synthesis of factors influencing implementation
Enablers Barriers
Vouchers for maternity care services
Maternal Health Voucher
Scheme, Bangladesh
Increased skilled birth
attendance, facility births,
antenatal care and postnatal care
-Activities by community workers
and local leaders to raise
awareness of the programme
[81]
-Inclusion of transport costs
[80, 81]
-‘Seed’ funds for participating
facilities to promote investment
in services and capacity [81]
-Perceived poor quality of care at
participating facilities [81]
-Pressure from local politicians to
distribute vouchers to ineligible
women [81]
Pilot vouchers, Bangladesh Increased skilled birth
attendance, facility births,
antenatal care and postnatal care
-Inclusion of transport and
medicine costs [85]
-Poor awareness of the
programme among target
groups [85]
-Perceived poor quality of care at
participating facilities [85]
Voucher programme, Cambodia Increased skilled birth attendance
and postnatal care. No effect on
antenatal care.
-Awareness generation by
voucher distributors [87]
-Output-based reimbursements
for providers [87]
None stated
Chiranjeevi Yojana, India No effect on skilled birth
attendance, antenatal care and
postnatal care
-Community health workers
provided information on the
programme [88]
-Use of an existing government
system (‘below poverty line’
cards) as a targeting mechanism
[88]
-Poor awareness of the
programme among target
groups [89]
-Distance to participating
facilities in rural areas [88]
-Cost of transportation [92]
-Demands for additional or
informal payments [88, 92]
-Providers not reimbursed for
postnatal care [88]
-Provider attrition in urban areas
[89]
-Waning political commitment
[89]
Vouchers for Health, Kenya Increased skilled birth attendance
and facility births. No effect on
antenatal care and postnatal care
-Awareness generation by
voucher distributors and
previous service users [99]
-Locally appropriate tool for
targeting pregnant women from
low-income households [99]
-Output-based reimbursements
for providers [94]
-Perceived poor behaviour of
staff at participating hospitals
[94]
-Distance and lack of transport to
participating facilities [96, 100]
-Cost of travel to health facilities
[99, 100]
-Cost of purchasing vouchers
[96, 100]
-Overly bureaucratic process for
determining eligibility [94]
-Delays in contract signing and
voucher printing [99]
Pilot vouchers, Pakistan Increased facility births. Mixed
picture of positive and no effect
on antenatal and postnatal care
-Awareness generation by
voucher distributors [103, 104]
-Many women left the facility
within 24 h after giving birth as
there was no one to look after
their homes and children [103]
-Distance to participating
facilities [104]
Makerere University Voucher
Scheme, Uganda
Increased facility births -Inclusion of transport costs [107]
-Output-based reimbursements
for providers [107]
None stated
HealthyBaby vouchers, Uganda Increased facility births, antenatal
care and postnatal care
-Locally appropriate tool for
targeting pregnant women from
low-income households [106]
-Turnover of staff in the Ministry
of Health [106]
-Cost of travel to health facilities
[106]
-Procedural burden of fraud
detection system [106]
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experience of coercion when birth in a health facility
becomes a conditionality for women to receive state
welfare payments. There is comparatively little evi-
dence on the implementation of unconditional cash
transfers as part of maternal and neonatal health
programmes, despite growing interest in these within
the international development community. Similarly,
comparative research on alternative forms of
financing, such as health equity funds, would provide
useful insights. Furthermore, research on policy pro-
cesses and the reasons for introducing DSF schemes
rather than efforts to remove user fees or improve
supply-side quality of care could also help to generate
understanding of the role of these initiatives, how
they become sustainable and where they fit (or do
not fit) with plans to achieve equitable universal
health coverage.
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